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The Referendum on Catalan
Self-Determination (Part II)
Endemic Rhetoric, Interpretive Hypocrisy and Legal
Imagination
Constitutionalizing  Secession  in  Canada  and  Britain:  Setting  a(n)
(bad) example?
What encouraged the Catalans to place their bets on the persuasive
power  of  remedial  self-determination  were  two  constitutional,  not
international legal texts: the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1998 Reference
re Secession of Quebec,  and the 2013 Edinburgh Agreement between
the British and the Scottish governments on the referendum of the
independence  of  Scotland.  Though  neither  offered  support  to  the
Catalan  remedialist  vision  of  self-determination—the  Secession
Reference  empathetically  rejects  Quebecois’  remedial  self-
determination, while the Edinburgh Agreement remains silent on the
matter  altogether—both  offered  a  vision  of  a  liberal-democratic
constitutional order whose legitimacy in good part hinges on the way
in which it addresses democratically manifested, minoritarian political
aspirations. The Secession Reference expresses this spirit trenchantly:

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The  continued  existence  and  operation  of  the
Canadian  constitutional  order  cannot  remain
indifferent to the clear expression of a clear majority
of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in
Canada  …  The  rights  of  other  provinces  and  the
federal  government  cannot  deny  the  right  of  the
government of Quebec to pursue secession, should a
clear  majority  of  the  people  of  Quebec  choose  that
goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights
of others.
These statements are, of course, heavily qualified, and conditional. But
even as such, taking them seriously requires a radical reinterpretation
of  two  central  implications  of  a  still  widely  accepted  image  of  a
sovereign people as the author of a constitutional order: (1) that it is
that same people, in virtue of that act, that retains the authority to
reconstitute  it  either  through  a  revolutionary  exercise  of  its
constituent  power,  or  through  a  constitutionally-prescribed
amendment procedure, and (2) that such change either: (a) may—under
no circumstances— result in the violation of the (territorial) integrity
of the people and its state; or, if it does (b) that such change occurs in
conformity with the norms of the constitution, and not through the
exercise  of  someone  else’s  constituent  power,  or  the  right  to  self-
determination.
Though there are some who argue that Spain must remain committed
to option (2a), it is fair to say that even the most insistent opponents of
Catalan secession would support option (2b). To follow the logic of the
Canadian Supreme Court in the Catalan case, however, would not only
entail the rejection of (2b) but would also compel the detractors of the
Catalan independence to concede that:
(I) the Spanish constitutional order is under a duty to be responsive
towards a majoritarian preference for secession among the citizens of
Catalonia, established through the means of a referendum;
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(II)  the  responsiveness—in  this  case—means  that  the  organs  of  the
Spanish state ought to (a) commence negotiations over the secession
of  Catalonia,  (b)  towards  the  secession  of  Catalonia,  and—in  the
eventuality  of  their  failure,  (c)  not  obstruct  the  formation  of  an
independent  Catalan  state  (i.e.  to  facilitate  the  smooth  transfer  of
authority within Catalonia, and to be constructive in the negotiations
over succession of the debts, property, and international obligations of
the Spanish state).
So,  what  the  Catalans  demand—obliquely,  indirectly,  and
ambiguously—and what Spain likewise unequivocally rejects—is not the
right to ‘democratic management of public affairs’ (as the preambular
part  of  the Catalan Law on Self-Determination Referendum asserts)
but the propositions (I), (IIa), (IIb) and (IIc).
In that regard, two points ought to be mentioned. The first one will be
obvious to those who follow the trends in contemporary democratic
theory, in that present-day democratic theorists don’t simply ignore
(I),  (IIa-c).  For  the  most  part,  they  vehemently  reject  a  connection
between the ideals of responsiveness and the concept of democracy
and democratic self-government. Similarly, the second point will also
be taken as self-evident by most comparative constitutional scholars.
Unlike Britain and Canada, however,  Spain’s constitution affirms the
territorial  integrity  of  the  state  and  asserts  its  character  as  the
indivisible homeland of all Spaniards. Neither the Act(s) of Union 1707
(Britain)  nor  the  Constitution  Acts  1867  and  1982  (Canada)  contain
anything  resembling  such  a  provision.  What  is  more,  the  Canadian
Supreme Court in the Secession Reference  made very clear that  any
possible  act  of  secession  has  to  occur  in  conformity  with  (some)
amending formula, specified in the Constitution Act 1982. Though the
Secession Reference seems to require participants in the Confederation
(i.e.  the  federal  government,  and  the  provinces)  to—in  principle
—negotiate towards the secession of Quebec, Quebec is not entitled to
expect that such negotiations end favourably for its project. Likewise—
both the Scottish and the British governments seem to have agreed on
the  ad  hoc  character  of  the  2013  Edinburgh  Agreement:  mandated
neither by the Act(s) of Union 1707, nor by an (implicit) superiority of
the principle of  popular,  over that of  parliamentary sovereignty.  So,
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from both  the  perspective  of  contemporary  democratic  theory  and
that  of  comparative  law—and  this  is  something  which  Catalan
sovereigntists, secessionists, and nationalists prefer not to hear—Spain
is right: there is nothing, either in currently prevailing conceptions of
democracy  or  popular  constitutionalism,  which  would  justify  the
migration of the attitude with which the organs of the Canadian and
the British constitutional order approached the prospective secessions
of Quebec and Scotland.
Does this mean that Spain, in being right about that, is in possession of
a superior moral and conceptual argument overall? Not at all. Rather
than  grounding  it  in  a  superior  argument,  Spain’s  refusal  to  show
responsiveness to secessionist aspirations, those who authoritatively
speak for Spain at the moment rely on ideals undistinguishable from
those embraced by the Catalan secessionists themselves. It is the same
commitment to constitutionalism, the rule of law, and democracy that
define  the  ethics-political  character  of  the  antagonistic  political
projects  of  them  both.  Rather  than  being  incomparable  with  the
argument  offered  by  the  Catalans,  the  Spanish  argument  is  their
mirror image, and, predictably, just as problematic, both conceptually
and  ethically.  On  the  one  hand—though  oft-invoked  as  an  ethics-
political trump card against Catalan demands for self-determination—
the  idea  of  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  Spanish  ‘people’  is  as
conceptually  flimsy  as  the  ultimate  authority  of  the  Catalan  one:
assertions of  the latter  conveniently  neglects  the fact  that  it  is  the
‘people’ of Catalonia that exists as a constitutional entity only in virtue
of the relevant provisions of  the Spanish constitution;  asserting the
former conveniently neglects the fact that the Spanish people itself
exists in virtue of the willingness of a sufficient number of people to
turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  performative  contradiction  necessary  to
imagine it territorially.  On the other hand, to insist on the value of
constitutionalism and the rule of law, as the Spanish do, as somehow
prohibitive  of  a  more  accommodating  attitude  of  the  central  state
towards the secessionists aspirations, is equally disingenuous.
Though the logic of the  Secession Reference  is (against the claims of
Catalan sovereigntists)  neither straightforwardly,  nor unambiguously
applicable to Spain, it does stand as a reminder of one simple truth:
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Where there is a will, there is a way. Put differently, irrespective of the
available  rhetorical  covers—such  as  article  2  of  the  Spanish
Constitution (self-righteously relied upon by the Spanish government
in its allegedly principled indifference towards the Catalan aspirations
for  independence)—there  is  nothing  that  would  stop  the  Spanish
Constitutional Tribunal from reading into the Spanish constitution, if it
wished  to  do  so,  a  similar  unwritten  constitutional  obligation  of
responsiveness, just as the Canadian Supreme Court did when it chose
to ‘discover’ it in the history of Canadian constitutionalism. To claim
that this somehow violates the presumably moral right of democratic
self-government of the entire people of Spain conveniently forgets that
both juridical  creatures—not  only  the  Catalan,  but  also  the  Spanish
‘people’—stand on equally flimsy conceptual grounds, neither of which
would ever be possible without selective memory: an amnesia about its
juridical grounding in the text of the Spanish constitution, in the case
of the former; and forgetting, tout court, about the absence of juridical
origins, period, in the case of the latter.
Looking Beyond: The Catalan Referendum and Scholarship on Self-
Determination
So  here  we  are.  Though  Spain  is  no  communist  federation,  and
Mariano Rajoy is no Slobodan Milošević,  Catalan secessionists ended
up reaching for the same heavy rhetorical artillery that were once used
by their Slovenian and Croatian ‘colleagues’: the assertion of the right
to self-determination as a juridical (and not just moral), non-negotiable
entitlement to exercise one’s sovereignty a la carte. More than two and
half decades after one of the most traumatic political breakups in the
history of Europe, the political destiny of another multinational state is
again being argued with the help of the same combustible vocabulary
—invoked,  as  always,  hypocritically,  self-righteously,  and  single-
mindedly.  Having  said  this,  I  hasten  to  add  that  this  short  piece
shouldn’t  be  read  as  a  denunciation  of  Catalan  aspirations  for
independence. To the contrary: the time has come to turn one’s gaze
to other, less visible ‘culprits’: jurists and scholars, both international
and  constitutional,  and  their  impoverished  legal  and  political
imaginations, which set the stage for a new dawn of a concept long
thought to be among the living dead: on its death bed, dying, always
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almost, but not quite.
Rather than succumbing to their first impulse to evaluate how (if at all)
the  constitutional  crisis  in  Spain  affects  the  doctrine  of  self-
determination,  or  the  migration  of  the  language  of  clarity  in
international and comparative constitutional law, the scholars who’d
be  tempted  to  do  so  would  perhaps  do  well  to  treat  the  coming
independence referendum as an occasion to pause, look inward, and
ask: Is there anything in the way in which we’ve continued to approach
the  vocabularies  of  self-determination,  popular  sovereignty,  and
constitutionalism  over  the  last  20  years  that  has  contributed  to  a
situation (if only marginally) where nothing seems to have changed? To
a  situation,  that  is,  where—irrespective  of  valiant  attempts  at
discursive  innovation  on  the  Catalan  side  (e.g.  ‘dret  a  decidir’)  and
irrespective of the commendable self-restraint (thus far) on behalf of
the  Spanish  government  in  Madrid—the  simmering  conflict  over
territorial  sovereignty  reaches  an  all-too-familiar  point:  a  stand-off
between antagonists, now determined not to lose face, a potential turn
for the worse, possibly with devastating consequences. Though this by
no means suggests that the Catalan and the Spanish elites ought to be
excused for putting themselves, and the citizens they represent, in this
situation, it does suggest that it might be high time to talk about the
general failure of juridical and scholarly imagination which provided
those on the ground with little else than the same old hypocritical,
selective,  self-righteous,  inflaming,  and  deceptive  rhetoric  seen  on
display on so many occasions before. More specifically, the scholars of
both  public  international  as  well  as  comparative  constitutional  law
should ask themselves the following three questions:
(1)  What  are  the  scholarly  expectations,  precisely,  that  drive  their
attempts  to  disseminate  the  ideal  of  clarity  (of  the  referendum
question and of the winning majority)—as the most important formal
criterion  of  democratic  legitimacy  of  sovereignty  referenda?  In
Canada,  Montenegro,  and  the  United  Kingdom,  the  formalistic
vocabulary of clarity seems to have been effective in the sense that it
has successfully replaced a more substantive, traditionally dominant,
legitimizing vocabulary—that of the right to self-determination. Spain
and Catalonia demonstrate the limits of that approach, which seems to
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hinge  on  a  simple  expectation:  proceduralization  +  formalization  =
domestication  of  secession;  both  literally  (in  the  sense  of  rendering
international law irrelevant) as well as metaphorically (in the sense of
making secessionist contestation a gentler and more quotidian affair).
(2) What is the point of insisting—as many international legal scholars
do—on the inapplicability of the right to ‘external’ self-determination
in  the  context  of  secessionist  crises  in  otherwise  legitimate,
democratic,  and  inclusive  states—which  Spain,  irrespective  of  its
shortcomings, most certainly is? To claim that, as do advocates of the
remedial conception of that right, that the people vested with the right
to  self-determination  is  nothing  but  a  terminus  technicus  of
international law (not a real collective, but just the name that jurists
use as a conceptual shorthand when they evaluate the conformity of
sovereign states with their  fiduciary duties)—or,  as  is  the case with
opponents  of  the  ‘remedial’  conception,  that  the  right  to  self-
determination  is  just  another  way  of  referring  to  the  patterns  of
constitutional  government  established  in  conformity  with  the
principles  of  effectivity  and  non-intervention—is  something  which
cannot  be  separated  from its  rhetorical  implications.  Linguists  who
work  in  the  sub-field  of  pragmatics  would  probably  call  these
conventional implicatures: parts of the utterances that are suggested
even if not expressed or strictly implied.
Those implicatures exist, even if international jurists choose to ignore
them (possibly thinking that their interpretations of the right to self-
determination  will  never  actually  be  overheard  by  those  on  the
ground).  Once  we  allow  for  that  possibility,  however,  it  quickly
becomes  apparent  just  how  disturbing  the  implicatures  of  those
interpretations  may  be.  What  the  proponents  of  remedial  self-
determination imply, for example, cannot but amount to the following
advice:  If  you want to establish a new state in conformity with the
norms of international law, first make sure to be sufficiently oppressed
and discriminated against by your parent state. What opponents of this
interpretation suggest is not much better, either: Make sure that the
sacrifice of life and livelihood you are about to make (your own, and
that  of  your  opponent)  is  not  in  vain—that  you win  in  the  ‘trial  by
ordeal’ implicitly prescribed by the norms of international law (on the
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anti-remedial  conception  of  the  right  to  self-determination).  The
coming months will tell if Catalans are willing to go that far. What is
certain, however—and this brings us to the final, third point—is that
even  more  innovative  juridical  interpretations  of  the  right  to  self-
determination—such as those which assert the existence of an alleged
‘right to be taken seriously’—are sentenced to a destiny of not being
taken seriously without offering an explicit  answer to the following
question:
(3)  Is  institutional  responsiveness  an  ideal  of  democratic,
constitutional government? If not, why not? If yes, what is its status? Is
it  a  supra-constitutional  principle,  informing the  architecture  of  all
democratic constitutional orders? Or, is its applicability exhausted in
positive  constitutional  law;  in  whatever  democratic  arrangements  a
particular  constitutional  order  happens to  entrench? The latter,  for
example,  is  the  position  of  the  Spanish  government.  To  those  who
critique its adamant refusal to take the Catalan aspirations seriously,
they offer a response — to which, thus,  far,  there is no satisfactory
theoretical comeback: But,  we are taking them seriously,  just as the
established  rules  of  constitutional  contestation  intended  it!  If
constitutional  responsiveness—not  democracy,  not  self-government,
not popular sovereignty, not self-determination—is intended to mean
more than that,  than that  must  be stated explicitly,  and argued for
comprehensively.  Doing so will  require us  to confront  the anxieties
which have pushed us to invent the imaginative devices of ‘peoples’,
‘sovereignties’,  and self-determination ‘rights’  in  the first  place.  It  is
highly  doubtful  if  this  is  something  that  the  strategists  of  Catalan
sovereignty took into consideration when they placed their bets on the
rhetorical power of the international legal right to self-determination.
In fact,  in alleging that the refusal  of  the (otherwise unimpeachably
democratic)  Spanish  constitutional  order  to  be  responsive  towards
their  secessionists  aspirations  constitutes  the  reason  to  apply  the
‘remedy’ of external self-determination, Catalan secessionists seem to
have  started  from  the  assumption  that  the  moral,  political,  and
institutional appeal of the ideal of responsiveness thus understood, is
obvious—or at least intuitive—not dubious, and debatable.
The only thing left is to hope that the cost of this bet is not paid in the
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lives and livelihoods of ordinary Spaniards and Catalans. One thing is
certain: if the events after October 1 truly take a turn for the worse,
fingers  should  not  be  pointed  solely  towards  Barcelona  or  Madrid.
Scholars who’d be tempted to do so would do better to put  them on
their  foreheads  first,  and  ask  themselves  a  simple  question  already
mentioned above: Could it be that the discursive ‘fail’ of the right to
self-determination  (also)  has  something  to  do  with  the  style  of
scholarly  engagement  with  the  subject,  which  across  disciplinary
divides,  which—irrespective of its increasing sophistication and self-
awareness over the last 20 years—never really contended with it with
an  eye  on  the  conceptual  and  moral  imagination  of  those  on  the
ground? Needless to say, it is highly questionable whether partisans of
secession or its scholars will ever be able to escape what, in light of the
recent  resurgence  of  self-determination  rhetoric,  appears  to  be  a
veritable  Groundhog  Day  of  constitutional  imagination:  the  eternal
return  of  a  discursive  pattern  in  which  the  undeterred  and  the
committed, half-aware of their own hypocrisy, end up reaching for the
most volatile rhetorical compounds, only to provoke further outrage
by  those—equally  indifferent  to  their  own  double  standards—see
themselves  as  being  taken  for  a  ride.  Even  if  that’s  the  case—or
perhaps, precisely because of it—let the Catalan referendum at least be
a reminder of this predicament, not just another opportunity to apply
professional competences in ways that keep the business of legal and
theoretical scholarship as usual: thriving on the resentments, hopes,
and anxieties of those on the ground; indifferent to the possibility of
encouraging them to give a chance to new vocabularies that  might
mediate their deeply-felt aspirations differently.
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